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1Spatial Probit and the Geographic Patterns of State Lotteries
Abstract
We implement a spatial probit model to diﬀerentiate states with a lottery from
those without a lottery. Our analysis extends the basic spatial probit model by allow-
ing spatial dependence to vary across geographic regions. We also separate the spatial
eﬀects of neighbors versus non-neighbors. The methodology provides consistent and
eﬃcient coeﬃcient estimation in light of the simultaneity in spatial dependence. We
ﬁnd evidence of spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity in lottery usage, and we
ﬁnd that spatial patterns diﬀer signiﬁcantly by geographic region. The importance of
spatial dependence in state lottery usage suggests the need to consider spatial eﬀects
in empirical models examining the use of any policy tool by subnational governmental
units.
Keywords: spatial probit, state lotteries.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H71, H72, H73, C21, C25, R12.
1 Introduction
Spatial econometric techniques have been developed to eﬀectively capture spatial processes
in natural or experimental data (Anselin, 1988, 1995; Haining, 1990). In this paper we
introduce an extension of the spatial probit model and apply this model to the issue of state
lottery usage. Our spatial probit model is a less restrictive form of traditional spatial models
that assume the degree of correlation is the same for all cross-sectional units. We allow
spatial correlation to vary by geographic region and demonstrate that reducing restrictions
on spatial correlation coeﬃcients can result in signiﬁcant gains in model power. In addition,
we allow spatial eﬀects to diﬀer between neighboring and non-neighboring states. This
analysis suggests signiﬁcant diﬀerences and reveals that estimates from spatial models can
be sensitive to the spatial structure imposed.
The spatial probit model not only allows direct estimation of spatial dependence in
states’ decisions to have a lottery, it also provides for consistent and eﬃcient estimation
not aﬀorded by earlier studies of lottery usage. Our methodology provides consistent and
eﬃcient coeﬃcient estimation in light of the simultaneity in spatial dependence. Previous
studies on lottery usage attempted to capture the inﬂuence of neighboring states’ lottery
2status by including a variable that reﬂects whether a neighboring state has a lottery or a
variable reﬂecting the number of neighboring states having a lottery. However, the very
nature of spatial correlation suggests these variables are endogenous. The results of previous
studies may be inconsistent because they fail to address the simultaneity problem.
Spatial econometric models have been applied to numerous economic issues. Among the
issues examined are: 1) the decision by farmers to adopt new technologies by Case (1992);
2) the location of foreign direct investment in China by Coughlin and Segev (2000); 3) cross-
border shopping by Garrett and Marsh (2002); 4) the adoption of environmental treaties
by European countries by Murdoch et al. (2003); and 5) state ﬁscal decisions by Case et
al. (1993), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), and Hern´ andez-Murillo (2003). The major-
ity of these studies have applied spatial econometric techniques to models with continuous
dependent variables. Spatial models with discrete dependent variables have received little
application in the literature. Case (1992), Marsh et al. (2000), and Murdoch et al. (2003)
are noteworthy exceptions.
Previous research examining state ﬁscal decisions has shown spatial dependence in state
and local government policies such as tax rates and budget and expenditure levels. Figure
1 provides visual evidence suggesting that state lottery decisions are also interdependent.
New Hampshire adopted the ﬁrst modern-day state lottery in 1964 (panel a). Between 1964
and 1976, states in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and the Great Lakes approved lotteries
(panel b). In the subsequent 12 years, lotteries spread throughout states in the Midwest and
on the Paciﬁc Coast and began appearing in states in the Plains and Rocky Mountains. By
2000, the only groups of states without lotteries were in the South and the Rocky Mountains
(panel d). While state lottery usage is certainly a function of a state’s economic, political,
and demographic characteristics, our analysis allows a determination of whether the pattern
of state lottery usage is also due to a state’s proximity to other states having a lottery.
The conceptual frameworks that have been used to explain state lottery usage rely on the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4of the legislators. The most frequently used framework is the legislator-support maximiza-
tion approach (Filer at al., 1988). Legislators recognize that increased state spending can
increase their political support by increasing the welfare of their constituents. Martin and
Yandle’s (1990) duopoly transfer mechanism approach views the state as a rent-seeker and
a redistributive agent. Lotteries compete with both legal and illegal gambling operations,
and thus provide a mechanism that allows the state to generate some portion of the revenues
that they miss by their inability to tax illegal gambling. A third framework presented by
Erekson et al. (1999) views the representative legislator as maximizing utility subject to a
constraint.
The empirical implementation of these frameworks has proceeded in two ways, each
shedding light on diﬀerent issues. Filer et al. (1988), Martin and Yandle (1990), and
Davis et al. (1992) address the question of whether a state has a lottery as of a speciﬁc
year. Filer et al. (1988) and Davis et al. (1992) estimate cross section binary choice
models using probit models, while Martin and Yandle (1990) present results using ordinary
least squares. Alternatively, the estimation of duration models provides evidence on which
variables increase or decrease the expected time until a state adopts a lottery. Berry and
Berry (1990), Alm et al. (1993), Caudill et al. (1995), Mixon et al. (1997), and Erekson
et al. (1999) estimate hazard functions in their lottery adoption studies. Here the legislator
receives utility from improving the state’s ﬁscal wellbeing, but the legislator is constrained
by his reelection desires that hinge on the satisfaction of his constituents.
We explore the questions of what diﬀerentiates the states with a lottery from those
without a lottery, and to what extent the existence of lotteries in other states aﬀects the
lottery choice in a speciﬁc state. Our empirical approach, which is explained in detail later,
diﬀers from the previously-used approaches.
52 Data
We use data on the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia over the period 1964
to 2000. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables we use in our analysis.
Alm et al. (1993) hypothesize that a state is more likely to adopt a lottery when ﬁscal
and economic conditions in the state are relatively weak. To account for these factors, we
include in our model speciﬁcations the level of real per capita personal income, the percent
change in real state and local tax revenues, and the levels of real per capita transfers from
the federal government to state and local governments.1
A state’s decision to have a lottery may also be inﬂuenced by the amount of debt held by
state and local governments. As debt increases, a state lottery may become a more attractive
alternative for raising revenues. To capture this scenario, we include real per capita short and
long-term state and local debt in our empirical models.2 To date, the evidence concerning
the relationship between debt and lottery usage is mixed. Martin and Yandle (1990) and
Alm et al. (1993) have found statistically signiﬁcant evidence that higher levels of per capita
debt are associated positively with lottery usage. On the other hand, Caudill et al. (1995)
and Mixon et al. (1997) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship.
Political and demographic factors are also considered to be important in a state’s decision
to have a lottery (Alm et al., 1993; Clotfelter and Cook, 1989). We include a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the state has a referendum or initiative process, and 0 otherwise.3
The feasibility of a lottery is also correlated with the potential number of players in a state
and the ability of the state to run a more cost-eﬀective operation (DeBoer, 1985). Thus, we
also include population density in our empirical models.
Two groups likely to have strong views about gambling are the elderly and those belong-
1Per capita income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; state and local tax revenue and intergov-
ernmental transfer data were obtained from the U.S. Census’ Governmental Finances, various years. All
nominal variables were deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator (1996=100).
2Debt data were obtained from the U.S. Census’ Compendium of State Government Finances. Because
1987 data were not available, total state debt was multiplied by the average short-term percent of total and
the average long-term percent of total to arrive at long-term and short-term state debt in 1987.
3Obtained from Alm et al. (1993) and the Initiative and Referendum Institute.
6ing to religious denominations (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989). We include the percentage of
the state’s population that is older than age 65 and the percent of the population that is
Catholic.4 Those older than 65 can be characterized as typical lottery players. Moreover,
Alm et al. (1993) noted that this group is frequently opposed to other forms of tax increases.
In their study, however, this variable was not statistically signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, the views of religious groups toward gambling have been shown to
matter empirically. Martin and Yandle (1990), Berry and Berry (1990), Caudill et al. (1995),
Mixon et al. (1997), and Erekson et al. (1999) suggest fundamentalist religious groups (e.g.,
Baptists) are more likely to oppose a lottery than Catholics. The authors ﬁnd a negative
relationship between religious groups generally thought to oppose gambling and the existence
of a state lottery. Meanwhile, Alm et al. (1993) found a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between the percentage of a state’s population that was Catholic and the adoption of a
lottery.
Our empirical model allows us to control for the impact of whether a neighbor has a
lottery. As described later, we incorporate the impact of whether a neighboring state has a
lottery on a speciﬁc state via spatial econometric techniques. To date, four measures have
been used: 1) a dummy variable distinguishing whether an adjacent state has a lottery (Filer
et al. 1988; Alm et al. 1993); 2) the number of adjacent states with a lottery (Berry and
Berry 1990); 3) the percentage of adjacent states with a lottery (Erekson et al. 1999); and
4) the percentage of a state’s border shared with states having a lottery (Davis et al. 1992;
Caudill et al. 1995; Mixon et al. 1997). Excluding Filer et al. (1988), the preceding studies
found a positive relationship between their proxy and whether a state had a lottery.
4Percent of the population exceeding age 65 is from the U.S. Census’ Statistical Abstract of the United
States, various years. The percent of the population that is Catholic is from Religious Congregations and
Membership in US-2000 CD-ROM, published by Glenmary Research Center. Religious aﬃliation data is
only collected in decennial census years. Religious aﬃliation data is unavailable for Alaska and Hawaii until
1971; therefore 1971 data is used for those states for the period from 1964 to 1970.
7Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Min Max St. Dev.
Lottery Usage Status (yes 1; no 0) 0.389 0 1 0.394
Population Density (inhabitants per sq. mi.) 376.6 3.3 13,082.0 1,531.4
Real Personal Income (dollars per capita) 18,169.7 6,750.7 38,595.0 2,760.2
Real Tax Revenues (3-year moving average growth rate, %) 4.2 -14.0 32.0 2.5
Real Short Term Debt (dollars per capita) 92.9 0.0 1,271.9 118.2
Real Long Term Debt (dollars per capita) 2,996.8 132.9 9,073.2 1,191.4
Real Federal Grants (dollars per capita) 0.66 0.08 4.54 0.33
Referendum (yes 1; no 0) 0.520 0 1 0.504
Population Age 65 or Older (%) 11.3 1.0 18.6 1.7
Population Catholic (%) 18.8 0.7 63.5 13.6
The summary statistics use yearly cross-section data for 1964-2000.
Tax revenues, short and long term debt, and federal grants refer to state and local governments.
All nominal variables were deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator (1996=100).
3 Empirical Model: The Spatial Probit
The basic model of spatial dependence innovated by Cliﬀ and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988)
allows for spatial dependence in the dependent variable or in the error component. The
model with spatial dependence in the dependent variable is often referred to as a spatial
lag model or as a spatial autoregressive model. The model with spatial dependence in the
error term is referred to as a spatial error lag model, or as a spatial autocorrelation model.
Somewhat diﬀerent than autocorrelation in time series models, spatial dependence in cross-
sectional data is multi-dimensional in that it depends upon all contiguous or inﬂuential units
of observations.
The framework we use is similar to the standard spatial econometric model. The dis-
crete nature of our dependent variable and the panel structure of the data necessitate some
modiﬁcations of the standard model. Maximum likelihood estimation traditionally produces
consistent estimators for spatial models with continuous dependent variables. However, un-
less corrected for, spatial dependence in models with binary dependent variables introduces
heteroskedasticity that renders coeﬃcient estimates ineﬃcient.
The lottery status for a state i = 1,...,N at time period t = 1,...,T is derived, as in
the usual binary choice model, from a latent variable, y∗
it, and the rule yit = 11 [y∗
it ≥ 0].
The ﬁrst-order spatial lag model for the latent variable is given in vector form, stacking
8cross-sectional observations over all time periods, by:
(1) y
∗ = ρWy
∗ + Xβ + ε,
where X is a (TN × K) matrix of exogenous variables and ε is a (TN × 1) zero-mean error
term. The scalar ρ is the spatial lag coeﬃcient and reﬂects positive spatial correlation in the
dependent variable if ρ > 0, negative spatial correlation if ρ < 0, and no spatial correlation
if ρ = 0. 5 W is a (TN ×TN) block diagonal matrix having T copies of an (N ×N) spatial
weights matrix W along the diagonal. The individual elements of W = {ωij} are speciﬁed
later.
Spatial dependence can also occur in the error term, ε. Spatially correlated errors may
occur due to spatial correlation among the independent variables, spatial heterogeneity in
functional form, omitted variables, and spatial correlation in the dependent variable when a
spatially lagged dependent variable is not included in the model (Anselin, 1988; chapter 8).
The ﬁrst-order spatial error lag model is given as:
(2) ε = λWε + υ,
where υ is a (TN × 1) vector of i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and covariance
matrix σ2
υI.6 W is the (TN ×TN) matrix described earlier, and λ is a scalar that measures
spatial error correlation. The errors are positively correlated if λ > 0 , negatively correlated
if λ < 0, and not correlated if λ = 0.
Many alternative weighting schemes for W have been used in the literature. One of the
most common is the binary joins matrix (Cliﬀ and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988; Case, 1992)
5Unlike the standard ﬁrst-order autoregressive model in time series, spatial correlation coeﬃcients do not
necessarily have to lie between –1 and 1 in the ﬁrst-order spatial model. Generally, coeﬃcient values are
between the inverse of the largest and smallest eigenvalues of the weights matrix. See Anselin (1995).
6Our model makes the assumption that the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are zero. Re-
laxing this assumption, while potentially increasing eﬃciency, greatly complicates the estimation procedure.
Researchers have recently explored several alternative methods for estimating the spatial probit models that
use information in the oﬀ-diagonal elements (see Anselin (2002) and Fleming (forthcoming)).
9where ωij = 1 if observations i and j (i 6= j) share a common border, and ωij = 0 otherwise.
In this speciﬁcation, the elements of matrix W are row-standardized by dividing each ωij by
the sum of each row i.
A limitation of the binary joins matrix is that it assumes equal weights across all bordering
spatial neighbors and does not allow the eﬀective capture of spatial distances across all cross-
sectional units. Thus, we also considered various measures of spatial distance (d) that have
been discussed in the literature (Bodson and Peeters (1975), Dubin (1988), Garrett and
Marsh (2002), Hern´ andez-Murillo (2003)). Measures of spatial contiguity include the inverse
distance between states, where ωij = 1/dij, the inverse distance squared, where ωij = 1/d2
ij
and exponential distance decay, where ωij = exp(−dij). As the distance between states i
and j increases (decreases), ωij decreases (increases), thus giving less (more) spatial weight
to the state pair when i 6= j. In all cases, ωij = 0 for i = j. While there is no consensus on
how distance between cross-sectional units should be measured, we follow Hern´ andez-Murillo
(2003) and consider the distance between state population centers.7
We use the inverse distance spatial weights matrix and the binary joins matrix in our
empirical models. We chose to use both forms of weights matrices to highlight any diﬀerences
in spatial patterns of lottery usage in neighboring states only (captured by the binary joins
matrix) and between all states (captured by the inverse distance matrix).
Our basic speciﬁcation assumes that the inﬂuence of spatial dependence is the same for
all states. To reveal diﬀerences in spatial correlation for geographic regions, we also specify
distinct spatial correlation coeﬃcients for states in each of the eight BEA regions. Allowing






∗ + Xβ + ε,
7The distance was computed using the geographic coordinates for the population centroids computed







Here R denotes the total number of regions, and ρk and λk denote the spatial lag and spatial
error lag coeﬃcients, respectively, for region k. Wk remains an (TN × TN) block diagonal
matrix having T copies of an (N ×N) spatial weights matrix Wk along the diagonal.8 Now,
however, the elements of each matrix Wk are constructed to capture spatial correlation
between each state in region k and the remaining 47 states and the District of Columbia.
Thus, for each state i in region k, row i of Wk contains our measure of distance between
state i and all remaining 47 states and the District of Columbia. If state i is not in region k,
then row i of Wk contains all zeros. In essence, each matrix Wk is constructed by multiplying
each row of the matrix Wk by a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if state i is in region
k, and 0 otherwise.
Rewriting the full spatial autoregressive model by incorporating the structure in (3) and
(4) gives
(5) y













This structure induces heteroskedasticity. Correcting for heteroskedasticity is done using the
method of Case (1992) and Marsh et al. (2000). Renaming the last term in equation (5)












Wk = W, and therefore, the original model with constant spatial lag coeﬃcient
is a restricted version of the model with regional spatial lags.





















υ is the common variance of the υit’s. As in the standard probit speciﬁcation, for
identiﬁcation purposes, we assume that σ2
υ = 1.
The full spatial model in (5) is then premultiplied by the variance-normalizing trans-
formation Z = (diag(E[uu0]))−1/2, a (TN × TN) diagonal matrix. The transformed model
is:
(8) Zy













Clearly the event y∗
it > 0 is equivalent to the event Zy∗
it > 0; therefore yit = 1 [Zy∗
it ≥ 0]








itβ] + (1 − yit)ln(1 − Φ[X
∗
itβ])},
where X∗ = Z(I − ρW)−1X and Φ is the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution. Setting
ρ = 0 or λ = 0 allows estimation of the spatial lag or spatial error lag model, respectively,
and setting ρ = λ = 0 gives the log-likelihood for the standard probit model.
4 Estimation Results and Discussion
Tables 2 and 3 present the probit estimation results for alternative speciﬁcations of the
determinants of a state’s lottery usage.
12Table 2: Standard Pooled Probit and Probit with Binary Spatial Weights
Pooled Probit Binary Spatial Weights
No Spatial Eﬀects NLP in RHS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Population Density (log) ∗∗∗ 0.0311 ∗∗∗ 0.0499 ∗∗∗ 0.0945 ∗∗∗ 0.0414
[4.7367] [7.0646] [9.9670] [5.6539]
Per Capita Real Personal Income ∗∗∗ 4.9305 ∗∗∗ 3.5128 ∗∗∗ 3.1514 ∗∗∗ 5.3120
[21.6798] [11.1929] [8.7396] [18.8166]
Real Tax Revenues (growth rate) ∗∗∗-1.0235 ∗∗∗-0.8761 ∗∗∗-1.0879 ∗∗∗-1.1274
[4.0927] [3.4869] [4.4849] [3.8947]
Per Capita Real Short Term Debt -0.0100 0.0162 ∗-0.1368 -0.0138
[0.1617] [0.2634] [1.7108] [0.1896]
Per Capita Real Long Term Debt 0.7338 ∗∗ 1.4607 ∗∗ 2.3401 ∗ 1.3369
[1.0247] [2.1023] [2.4317] [1.7823]
Per Capita Real Federal Grants ∗∗∗-0.7988 ∗∗∗-1.2132 ∗∗∗-1.1785 ∗∗∗-0.8927
[3.4161] [5.2924] [3.4769] [3.4823]
Referendum ∗∗ 0.0330 ∗∗ 0.0390 ∗∗∗ 0.2382 ∗∗ 0.0428
[2.0073] [2.4172] [6.9647] [2.3931]
Population Age 65 or Older (share) ∗∗∗ 2.8696 ∗∗∗ 2.6585 ∗∗∗ 2.0160 ∗∗∗ 3.2785
[7.2885] [6.8300] [3.2464] [6.8139]
Population Catholic (share) ∗∗∗ 0.8731 ∗∗∗ 0.8752 ∗∗∗ 0.8709 ∗∗∗ 0.8245
[13.6201] [13.9817] [9.8439] [11.3221]






σ2 0.104 0.099 0.126 0.111
Log-Likelihood -570.712 -547.165 -443.78 -553.721
LR stat. 1298.754 1345.849 1552.617 1332.736
MF’s R2 0.532 0.552 0.636 0.546
No. Obs. 1813 1813 1813 1813
Top panel: mean marginal eﬀects; middle panel: probit coeﬃcients; z-statistics in square brackets.
Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
LR is the likelihood ratio test of the joint signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients other than the constant term, 2[lu − lr],
where lu is the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model, and lr is the log-likelihood of the restricted model.
McFadden’s pseudo R2 is deﬁned by R2 = 1 − lu/lr.
134.1 Pooled Probit and Binary Spatial Weights
Column [1] in table 2 corresponds to a standard probit model where no spatial eﬀects among
neighboring states are taken into account. The coeﬃcients represent the mean marginal
eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the probability of lottery usage.9 Column [2] cor-
responds to a speciﬁcation where the spatial interaction among states is accounted for by
including, for each state, the percentage of neighboring states that have already enacted a
lottery. This is analogous to the speciﬁcations used in previous hazard function approaches
to the adoption of state lotteries (Alm et al., 1993). As noted previously, this speciﬁcation
fails to account for the endogeneity of the lottery usage decision among states. This model
suggests that the probability of usage depends positively on the percentage of neighboring
states that have already adopted a lottery. It is important, therefore, to model the interac-
tion among neighboring states appropriately since the decision to adopt and maintain the
policy is an endogenous variable.
Columns [3] and [4] present the results from two alternative speciﬁcations in which we
account for spatial eﬀects using binary spatial weights to determine contiguity among states.
As we discussed before, this scheme considers as neighbors only those states that are adjacent
to each other. Column [3] corresponds to the model with a spatial lag in the dependent
variable, and column [4] corresponds to the model with a spatial lag in the error term. As
we can see from the table, the spatial dependence coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant. In
particular, the spatial lag coeﬃcient, ρ, indicates the presence of strategic interaction among
states in the choice of lottery usage.
Speciﬁcations [1] through [4] suggest that the level of real per capita state and local long
term debt has a positive impact on the lottery usage probability. The same is true for real
9For continuous variables, the coeﬃcients in tables 2 and 3 represent the average (taken over all the values
of the explanatory variables in the sample) of the derivative of the predicted probability with respect to the
variable in question. For the dummy referendum variable, the coeﬃcients represent the average absolute
change in the predicted probability when this variable takes a value of 1 relative to the case where it takes
a value of 0. The standard errors for the mean marginal eﬀects where computed from the covariance matrix
of the probit coeﬃcients using the Delta method.
14per capita personal income and for population density. Additionally, the growth rate of real
state and local tax revenues and real per capita levels of federal grants to state and local
governments have a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact. These results are consistent
with the theory that a state’s level of ﬁscal distress is an important determinant in the
usage of new revenue instruments. Real per capita levels of short term debt do not have a
statistically signiﬁcant impact on the lottery usage probability.
Previous studies have found that political variables, such as whether the state has a
referendum mechanism, have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the lottery usage probability. We ﬁnd
that the eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
The share of elderly population (65 years or older) and the share of Catholics in the
population also have a positive impact on the lottery usage probability. These results are
consistent with studies documenting the characteristics of lottery players.
In the models corresponding to the binary spatial weights, both the spatial lag in the
dependent variable and the spatial lag in the error term are statistically signiﬁcant from
zero at the 1 percent level. The log-likelihood of model [3], with only a spatial lag in the
dependent variable is, however, substantially higher.10
4.2 Inverse-Distance Decay Spatial Weights
An alternative deﬁnition of neighborhood eﬀects in the lottery usage decision allows decisions
in nearby states that are not necessarily adjacent to aﬀect a speciﬁc state. In this case, the
use of inverse-distance spatial weights is more appropriate to identify spatial interactions
among the states. Columns [1] through [5] in table 3 present the estimation results using
spatial weights computed as the inverse distance between states’ population centroids.
The results are qualitatively similar to those in table 2. The results from a joint spatial
model, in column [3], suggest spatial interaction in both the dependent latent variable and
in the error term. The coeﬃcients for the spatial lag in columns [1] and [3] are positive,
10The model with both a spatial lag in the dependent variable and in the error term could not be estimated
using binary weights because of identiﬁcation problems.
15Table 3: Probit with Inverse-Distance Decay Spatial Weights
Inverse-Distance Decay Spatial Weights
Spatial Lag Spatial Error Spatial joint Regional Spatial lags
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Population Density (log) ∗∗∗ 0.0677 ∗∗∗ 0.0319 ∗∗∗ 0.0659 ∗∗∗ 0.1015 ∗∗∗ 0.1098
[8.1108] [4.6908] [7.9932] [15.0023] [12.5342]
Per Capita Real Personal Income ∗∗∗ 2.5722 ∗∗∗ 4.9142 ∗∗∗ 2.7876 ∗∗∗ 1.0635 ∗ 0.3791
[7.4206] [20.8090] [8.1658] [4.2104] [1.7883]
Real Tax Revenues (growth rate) ∗∗∗-0.8355 ∗∗∗-1.0022 ∗∗∗-0.8701 ∗∗∗-0.3774 ∗∗-0.2695
[4.0598] [3.9614] [3.9745] [2.9331] [2.5065]
Per Capita Real Short Term Debt ∗∗∗ 0.2546 -0.0031 ∗∗∗ 0.3384 0.0263 0.0591
[3.6127] [0.0468] [3.6075] [0.5590] [1.2132]
Per Capita Real Long Term Debt ∗ 1.5817 0.7468 ∗ 1.5746 ∗∗∗ 2.1879 ∗∗∗ 2.6637
[1.8652] [1.0327] [1.9043] [3.0205] [4.1296]
Per Capita Real Federal Grants ∗∗∗-1.0844 ∗∗∗-0.7229 ∗∗∗-0.9332 ∗∗∗-1.3641 ∗∗∗-0.4992
[3.8699] [2.8678] [3.1141] [6.5739] [2.6940]
Referendum ∗∗∗ 0.1403 ∗∗ 0.0347 ∗∗∗ 0.1472 ∗∗∗ 0.0957 ∗∗∗ 0.0872
[5.7042] [2.0907] [5.8546] [4.1035] [3.7230]
Population Age 65 or Older (share) ∗∗ 1.2902 ∗∗∗ 2.9006 ∗∗∗ 1.5383 ∗∗∗ 1.5594 ∗∗ 0.8107
[2.4609] [6.7848] [3.0703] [3.6922] [2.0706]
Population Catholic (share) ∗∗∗ 1.3333 ∗∗∗ 0.8808 ∗∗∗ 1.3262 ∗∗∗ 1.2350 ∗∗∗ 0.8270
[14.0798] [13.4928] [12.7001] [12.0459] [7.4606]
Share of Neighbors with Lottery (NLP)
RHO ∗∗∗ 7.6691 ∗∗∗ 7.4620
[18.0835] [16.1675]
LAMBDA ∗∗ 5.3260 ∗∗∗ 5.0678 ∗∗∗ 5.0059
[2.4853] [4.5738] [3.0486]
RHO1 (New England) ∗∗∗16.1965 ∗∗∗14.2287
[15.1686] [5.7785]
RHO2 (Mideast) ∗∗∗ 4.3018 ∗∗∗ 9.0582
[2.9529] [3.2495]
RHO3 (Great Lakes) ∗∗∗ 4.2418 ∗∗∗ 3.3517
[3.4298] [2.9223]
RHO4 (Plains) ∗∗∗ 7.4210 ∗∗∗ 8.0902
[4.4004] [3.9550]
RHO5 (Southeast) ∗∗∗ 3.7385 ∗∗∗ 2.4991
[4.5737] [3.6667]
RHO6 (Southwest) ∗∗∗ 5.7908 ∗∗∗ 6.3611
[3.6374] [4.2545]
RHO7 (Rocky Mountain) ∗∗∗18.0134 ∗∗∗16.5425
[5.1627] [4.3866]
RHO8 (Far West) ∗∗∗15.0908 ∗∗∗14.0484
[4.0690] [3.6732]
σ2 0.132 0.104 0.131 0.176 0.207
Log-Likelihood -497.783 -570.57 -492.69 -434.788 -430.393
LR stat. 1444.612 1299.039 1454.799 1570.601 1579.391
MF’s R2 0.592 0.532 0.596 0.644 0.647
No. Obs. 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813
Top panel: mean marginal eﬀects; middle panel: probit coeﬃcients; z-statistics in square brackets.
Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
LR is the likelihood ratio test of the joint signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients other than the constant term, 2[lu − lr],
where lu is the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model, and lr is the log-likelihood of the restricted model.
McFadden’s pseudo R2 is deﬁned by R2 = 1 − lu/lr.
16supporting the conclusion from model [3] in table 2 that there is a positive interaction in
the choice of lottery usage among states. In a strategic framework, this suggests that the
policy choices of states’ usage of a lottery behave as strategic complements, in the sense that
a state will ﬁnd it to its advantage to adopt and maintain the policy if its rivals adopt it as
well.11
The numerical interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients is as follows.12 The ﬁndings in
column [5] of table 3, for example, suggest that a $1,000 increase in real per capita personal
income yields, on average, an increase of about 0.38 percentage points in the probability
of lottery usage, since real per capita personal income is measured in $100,000s. The same
scale is used for the real per capita long term state and local debt. On the other hand,
real per capita short term debt is measured in $1,000s, but the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.
An increase of 1 percentage point in the annual growth rate of real tax revenues induces a
decrease in the probability of lottery usage of about 0.27 percentage points, as this variable
is measured in decimal points (that is, 0.01 equals 1 percent); the same scale is used for
the share of elderly population and the share of Catholic population. Finally, real per
capita transfers from the federal government are measured in tenths of dollars, therefore,
the coeﬃcient indicates that a $1 increase in per capita transfers decreases the probability
of lottery usage by about 5 percentage points. The interpretation for the dummy variable
is straightforward, as the coeﬃcient indicates that states with a referendum process have a
probability of usage that is about 8 percentage points larger, on average, than the probability
of usage among states without a referendum.
We have included two models in which we isolate the regional correlation coeﬃcients as
we described in section 3. Each coeﬃcient, ρk, measures the average correlation between a
state in region k and the spatially weighted lottery status of all other states. Diﬀerences in
11Notice also that although the sign on the spatial error lag is negative in column [4] of table 2 and
positive in column [2] of table 3, the models with only a spatial lag in the error term have considerably
smaller likelihood than models with only the spatial lag in the dependent variable or with both a spatial lag
in the dependent variable and in the error term.
12The explanatory variables were transformed to a similar scale for the estimation. This is often necessary
to facilitate the convergence of the optimization algorithm in maximum likelihood estimation.
17the regional lag coeﬃcients, {ρk}, are attributable to two factors. First, the average distance
from a state to all other states varies across regions—that is, the spatial weights matrices
Wk diﬀer for diﬀerent k’s. Second, the number of states having a lottery increases over time.
Each regional coeﬃcient, ρk, captures both factors.
We ﬁnd considerable evidence that the eﬀects of spatial correlation in the dependent vari-
able vary by region. As reported in columns [4] and [5] of table 3, all the regional correlation
coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant; furthermore, visual inspection of the
estimated coeﬃcients suggests diﬀerences in the magnitude of spatial correlation between a
state in a given region and all other states. A likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis
that all the regional coeﬃcients, {ρk}, are identical (comparing models [4] and [1]), yields a
statistic of 125.99. The corresponding p-value for a χ2 distribution with 8 degrees of freedom
is essentially zero, so we can safely reject the null hypothesis. Comparing models [5] and
[3] with the same null hypothesis, we obtain a statistic of 124.59, so we also reject that the
regional spatial lags are identical.
Model [5], where we allow also for spatial dependence in the error term, provides the
largest log-likelihood. Comparing this model with model [4], where we assume that there is
no spatial dependence in the error term, we obtain a likelihood ratio statistic of 8.79. The
corresponding p-value for a χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 0.003. This implies
that considerable explanatory power is gained by relaxing the assumption that spatial eﬀects
in lottery usage are identical across regions. Furthermore, the probit speciﬁcation of lottery
usage seems to exhibit spatial dependence in the error term as well.
5 Conclusion
Using spatial econometric techniques, we show that the spatial patterns associated with
state lottery usage result from a combination of the characteristics of individual states and
the decisions of their neighbors. Five characteristics—population density, real per capita
18personal income, real per capita state and local debt, the share of a state’s population that
is elderly, and the share of a state’s population that is Catholic—are related positively to
whether a state has a lottery.
The results from spatial probit models strongly indicate that a state’s decision to have
a lottery is dependent on the decisions made by other states. Using either a binary or
inverse distance weights matrix in the estimation of spatial eﬀects, we ﬁnd that proximity
to states that have a lottery will increase the probability that a given state will itself have
a lottery. In addition, we provide strong evidence that spatial dependence in state policies
can vary by region. Unlike previous research, this study is the ﬁrst to directly model and
provide estimates on the spatial interdependence of states’ decision to have a lottery, and
the approach taken here aﬀords the estimation of consistent and eﬃcient coeﬃcients. The
importance of spatial eﬀects on the choice of state lottery usage suggests that such eﬀects
should be considered in examining the determinants of other state government policies.
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